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1 Introduction 
Munich, like Vietnam, is a metonym. If Vietnam is now shorthand for the misconceived cause, 
obdurately pursued to deadly effect, Munich has sustained for seventy years its meaning of 
shameful betrayal, weakness, and capitulation. 
- Kate Mcloughlin1 
 
     In the end of September 1938, about eleven months before the German 
invasion of Poland, which marked the start of the second World War, the leaders 
of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy met in Munich to settle a dispute 
regarding the so called Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. The Sudentenland, mostly 
comprised by the districts Bohemia and Bavaria, was home to many German 
speaking citizens, which prompted Nazi Germany to claim a “historical right” to 
the region, wanting it to be incorporated in the Greater Germany. Only about six 
months earlier, in March the same year, Adolf Hitler had a similar policy when he 
initiated the annexation (German: Anschluss) of Austria. 
At the time, both France and Great Britain saw the agreement as a way to 
avoid yet another war in Europe, and for Germany, it was a great victory and yet 
another region incorporated into their Third Reich. Czechoslovakia, while 
agreeing with the terms of the agreement under the threat of war, felt betrayed by 
the Allied powers for not taking a stand against the Nazi regime. 
In this thesis, I will look at British newspaper reports regarding the Munich 
agreement. The aim is to identify the different reactions from the different papers, 
as well as any British arguments for and against the agreement. I will adopt the 
theoretical framework of agenda setting, analysing how media sets the agenda in 
the societal discourse. In this case, it means analysing in what way different 
British newspapers seek to convey their “reality” regarding the time surrounding 
the negotiations which led to the signing of the Munich agreement. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 McLoughlin, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p. 543-562, p. 543 
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1.1 In retrospect – What we know that they didn’t 
In 2016, almost 80 years after the Munich agreement was signed, it is easy to 
look back at the actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, as well as 
the actions of France, Germany and Italy, and point at what went wrong. The 
politics of appeasement can easily be criticized after decades of research within 
history, political science and other disciplines. We also have a more grand 
perspective when we look at the events prior to the expansion of the German 
Reich. Looking back, the imperial ambitions of Hitler were obvious, and it can be 
hard to see the logic behind the appeasement.  
Indeed, the Munich agreement has been considered such a failure that it 
became a “measurement of failure”, used to be recalled when other politicians 
have made similar mistakes. As McLoughlin puts it: 
“Vietnam was called Richard Nixon’s Munich after George McGovern’s trip to Hanoi; Jeane 
Kirkpatrick played the Munich card to justify Ronald Reagan’s intervention in Nicaragua; and, 
most recently, the failure of Munich-style appeasement has been cited in support of the Bush/Blair 
invasion of Iraq, most notably by Donald Rumsfeld”. 2 
However, going back to 1938, only 20 years after the First World War, one of 
the deadliest wars in the history of mankind, the threat of yet another war proved 
to be one of the most significant variables in foreign relations. It is also important 
to understand that the British did not think that they could win a war against 
Germany, and definitely not against Germany and its allies. 3 Meanwhile, 
Chamberlain could not count on the Soviet Union to come to Czechoslovakias aid 
in case of a German attack. Nor could he count on the help of any German 
resistance, as Hitler was undoubtedly a popular leader.4 Anxiety was rampant 
when the Sudeten crisis developed, and the leaders of the free world (that is, Great 
Britain and France) wanted to guarantee a lasting peace, no matter the cost.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 McLoughlin, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p. 543-562, p. 545f 
3 Shepardson, 2006, A Faraway Country: Munich Reconsidered, The Midwest Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 81-
99, p. 82 
4 Ibid. p. 84 
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By using Czechoslovakia as a bargaining chip, they were hoping to guarantee 
peace for generations to come, by “correcting” the errors made during the Paris 
Peace Conference. There was also the issue of British (and French) economy. 
With a costly world war only 20 years back, the economy was still recovering, 
and was it not for US support, the economy might have collapsed. This made the 
prospects of hasty rearmament all but non-existent. 
This lack of information and perspective is, of course, even more true for the 
public and the media at the time. Information shared with the media was (and by 
all means still is) limited, and for the general population, it is even more true. 
Today, when many political documents have been made public, we have access to 
information that was not available to the general public in 1938. Thus, the public 
was heavily dependent on the media. 
1.2 Purpose and Research Question 
     The main purpose of this thesis is to look at media reports made with regards 
to the then newly signed Munich agreement. In a pre-digital age, local media 
outlets had the power to “set the reality”, and shape public perceptions and 
agenda, and analysing their power over information, we can further our 
understanding of agenda setting in the age before television and internet. My 
research question is as follows: 
 
 How did British newspapers depict the Munich crisis, the Munich 
agreement, and the British role in the negotiations, shortly after the 
agreement was signed? 
 
This question also leaves open for a secondary question: 
 
 What are the general differences between different newspapers, regarding 
the way the agreement, and the British role in the negotiations, was 
reported, and how could these differences be explained? 
  4 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
In the process of going through relevant material, I noticed that there is an 
abundance of sources that will be helpful to my analysis, to such an extent that I 
had to limit the scope, with regards to how many days I will cover. Originally, the 
thought was to analyse the period between September 1st and October 31st, 
roughly one month before the agreement was signed, until one month after the 
signing. Instead, I will analyse articles written between September 23rd and 
October 7th, excluding September 25th and October 2nd, being Sundays5. Earlier 
publications will also be used to provide context, but will not be used as a main 
part of my analysis. Since the research question prompts me to focus on the time 
after the agreement was signed, most of the analysis will focus on the period 
between September 30th and October 7th. 
1.4 Previous research 
     Before moving on to the core of my research, some words need to be said 
about the previous research related to the Munich agreement, and the politics of 
appeasement which led to the signing of the agreement. There is, of course, not 
possible to present all the research on the subject, but I have chosen to present 
some literature that I found both helpful and relevant to my research. 
Vít Smetana, a Czech historian, have written an extensive book (In the 
Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942) on 
the relationship between Great Britain and Czechoslovakia during the time 
surrounding World War II. This is done by, among other things, going through 
British parliamentary documents to see how the Czechoslovakian question was 
discussed within the halls of power.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Newspapers were not printed on Sundays. 
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Reading Smetana’s book, the distinction between then and today, regarding 
the issue of German claims on Czechoslovakian territory, becomes apparent. Not 
only was it conceivable for politicians to let Germany take control over the 
Sudeten areas, but rather was it desirable.  
In 1934, Edward H. Carr, a Foreign Office analyst and famous historian, said 
that “the Germans needs Sudentenland”, and Thomas Inskip, Minister of the Co-
ordination of Defence, saw no reason to defend even the existence of a 
Czechoslovakian republic. Meanwhile, Sir John Simon questioned the very 
existence of the state, and Sir Joseph Addison, British Minister to Czechoslovakia, 
telegrammed from Prague of “inferior Slavs” and a nonviable “artificial country”. 
Addison’s deputy, Robert Hadow, got his primary information from Sudeten 
German leaders, including those with Nazi sympathies.6 In addition to this, the 
British government repeatedly overestimated the potential of the German army, 
which made the fear of war even greater. With a vast empire, increasingly harder 
to maintain because of conflict, a war would be a catastrophe for Great Britain. 7 
Smetana also, albeit briefly, discusses the British media and it’s role during 
the time between the Anschluss and the Munich agreement, stating that British 
newspapers were “an influential catalyst of public opinion”, that there was a 
consensus regarding the subject of the Sudeten crisis, and that appeasement was 
the right way to move forward. The Times, for example, promoted the politics of 
appeasement, where a lasting peace should be secured at any cost.8 
Kate McLoughlin’s Voices of the Munich Pact brings into light a few articles  
on the crisis surrounding Czechoslovakia, including one from The New York 
Times, where the Czechs are described as the very opposite of the frenzy and 
blaze Hitler had shown in his speech in Nuremberg speech on September 12th.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Smetana, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942, p. 44f 
7 Smetana, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942. p. 46f 
8 Smetana, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942. p. 47 
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In the article, the author points out that the people of Czechoslovakia shows a 
great deal of “self-control and calm nerves”, even in the face of the German 
threat. 9  
In A Ghost of Appeasement, R. Gerald Hughes re-visits the Munich agreement 
and its legacy. He points out that after the Second World War, the Munich 
agreement was a source of great shame for the British, and it was often used as an 
argument for and against certain political stances. 10  
Furthermore, the consequences of the agreement was apparent also after the 
war, as Czechoslovakia – as so many other Eastern European states – became a 
communist state, arguably since the divide between Sudeten Germans and non-
Sudeten Czechoslovakia cut the ties to the West.11 During and after the war, there 
was an unwillingness to concede that the agreement was a failure, and that the 
British knew fully well that the “sacrifice” of the Sudeten areas wouldn’t please 
Hitler, as that would imply that Chamberlain would have been in league with the 
Nazi regime.12 It would take until 1990 until the British, through then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, apologized for the agreement and the politics of 
appeasement in the 1930’s. 
Though newspapers have been previously analysed, for example by 
McLoughlin mentioned above, there have not been any extensive research with 
regards to more peripheral newspapers and their articles on the topic. What makes 
this interesting is that the newspapers used in this thesis are local, and therefore 
did not reach as many readers as, for example, The London Times. More about 
why this is interesting will be elaborated on in sub-chapter 1.6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 McLoughlin, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p. 543-562, p. 552 
10 Hughes, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716, p. 690 
11 Hughes, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716, p. 699 
12 Hughes, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716, p. 706 
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1.5 Material and method 
     In this thesis, I have conducted a qualitative text analysis (content 
analysis), in which I have chosen a sample from a database, which holds 
relevance to my research question. The material I’ve analysed was obtained 
through an online library called The British Newspaper Archive. I have used their 
search engine to find relevant articles that I have used in my research. Since the 
results are shown in pages, and not separate articles, the quantity of material will 
be measured in pages instead of the number of articles. Most pages have two or 
more articles, varying in length, dealing with the subject of the Munich 
agreement, its prologue and subsequent reactions. In my analysis, I have gone 
through 195 pages dated between September 2nd and October 7th.  
All of them will not be referenced, since some information might not be 
wholly relevant or provide new information, but nonetheless, all articles have 
been thoroughly examined. The main period of analysis, September 23rd until 
October 7th, consists of 146 pages of material, and are divided as follows: 
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In addition to the numbers of pages listed here, I have analysed another 49 
pages of material, dating between September 2nd and September 22nd, a period 
characterized by a number of relevant events prior to the negotiations that led to 
the Munich agreement. Since the archive does not contain articles from major 
newspapers, such as The Daily Mail or The Times, the articles are often found in 
smaller newspapers, such as The Scotsman, Northern Whig, Western Morning 
News, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Hull Daily Mail. 
Even though the lack of publications from bigger newspapers is unfortunate, it 
is in itself not a problem, since it is also interesting to analyse the peripheral 
media actors during this time (or any other time, for that matter). It might not give 
us the large picture in the same way as the national newspapers would, but 
nevertheless, the number of different newspapers are more than satisfactory to 
provide a good basis of analysis. Even so, since most articles are purely 
informative, many newspapers, be it The London Times or The Scotsman, have the 
same sources, such as telegrams, statements, etc. The difference in reporting 
rather lies with how this information is mediated, and it is this difference that my 
analysis explores. It is also worth noting that several newspapers in my analysis 
had their own correspondents, both in Great Britain and abroad, giving different 
newspapers different perspectives on the same events. In that regard, there is no 
difference between different newspapers, no matter the size. 
It should also be noted that the author of any given article is more often than 
not unknown, as they are not signed in the same way as more modern articles. 
This presents several issues that are worth mentioning, even though they may not 
affect the analysis itself.  
First of all, not knowing the author behind articles makes it harder to take note 
of any tendencies among different authors, and explore any consistencies (or 
inconsistencies) between different texts. If authors were presented, I could’ve 
more easily assess any personal or ideological “twists” made from article to 
article. Second, it makes it somewhat harder to differentiate between regular 
articles, written mainly with the purpose to report news, and editorials, which are 
more often written from a personal perspective, with a more agenda setting 
purpose.  
  9 
However, both of these issues can be handled, and have indeed been handled, 
by using a more inclusive research question and method. The research question is 
structured in a way so as to include not only editorials or letters to the editor, but 
also “pure” news reports. Meanwhile, my method is not only used to identify any 
ideals or opinions behind obviously tendentious text, but is also used to read 
between the lines of regular news reports to see if the same event is reported in the 
same way, independent of the newspaper and, if not, see in what way it is done 
differently. Therefore, I have analysed all texts related to the Munich agreement, 
as well as articles dealing with the subject of the Anglo-German non-war pact.13  
Since the articles are often written in a vivid language, more like a form of 
story-telling than strict news reports, I have chosen to reflect this rhetoric within 
the analysis, sometimes writing in the same manner. Since one of the main aims 
of this thesis is to highlight any linguistic/rhetorical differences between different 
newspapers, it is important to convey these differences in a convincing way. 
Being in essence a descriptive analysis, it is important not only to convey what 
was written, but also how it was written. 
Unlike the quantitative text analysis, the qualitative one uses a more in-depth 
reading of the material, isolating the relevant from the irrelevant.14 The method is 
suitable for analysing texts such as manifestos, novels and newspapers. It is 
sometimes used in studies related to mass communication, for example by 
analysing the prevalence of a certain topic within different media sources.15 For 
this study, the first step was to choose central terms to find articles that could be 
of use in my analysis.16 Second, I have made a “mapping system”, where I 
systematize my material, putting it in different categories based on sub-questions 
which will help me to answer my main research question.17  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 These two news were often reported side by side, as they were both signed at the same day, with the presence 
of Chamberlain  
14 Esaiasson et al, 2007, Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, p. 237 
15 Bergström & Boréus, 2005, Textens mening och makt – metodbok I samhällsvetenskaplig text- och 
diskursanalys, p. 44ff 
16 Such as Munich, Chamberlain, Czechoslovakia, etc. 
17 Esaiasson et al, 2007, Metodpraktika, p. 238f 
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For example, the answer to “what does The Scotsman write about the 
Czechoslovakian perspective on the Munich agreement?” will help me see one 
perspective of the reports. Do they consider this at all? Do they see the 
Czechoslovakian sacrifice as an appeasement to Germany, or as something 
necessary to secure peace? Or perhaps both? All such questions are relevant to the 
bigger picture, and can be seen as units of knowledge, which I use to produce my 
answer. 
     Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus notes that a content analysis often aim to 
find out “to what extent something is valued as positive or negative and/or if there 
is a difference in such a valuation between different sources...”.18 The 
“something” here is the Munich agreement, and the sources are, as have been 
mentioned, the newspaper articles I have chosen in my sample. Regarding what 
constitutes a positive or negative valuation (claim) about the agreement, it is quite 
straight-forward: Is the agreement condoned or condemned, and in what way? 
This, then, gives me the answer to my question “How did British newspapers 
depict the Munich agreement, and the British role in the negotiations, shortly after 
the agreement was signed?”. 
1.6 Theory – Media and agenda setting 
Agenda setting theory can be traced back almost a hundred years, to Public 
Opinion, written by Walter Lippmann in 1922, though the term “agenda setting” 
did not come to life until the second half of the 20th century.  
In short, agenda setting is based on the assumption that the media is a main 
producer of our perception of the world, and “shaping political reality”.19 Since 
the people cannot observe the entire world themselves, they often look to media 
for a “piece of reality”.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18 Bergström & Boréus, 2005, Textens mening och makt, p. 47 
19 McCombs & Shaw, 1972, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 
36, No. 2. (summer, 1972), pp. 176-187, p. 176 
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McCombs and Shaw used the theory of agenda setting in their study of the US 
1968 presidential election, looking for a connection between the opinions of the 
voters and what the media reported on. In their study, they came to the conclusion 
that the media has significant power on what the voters saw as important issues. 
 A central assumption within the theory of agenda setting is that truth is a matter 
of perspective. Thus, in my case, it is the perspectives that the newspapers are 
publishing that constitutes the “truth”. 
However, the content of this piece of reality depends on the distributer, i.e. the 
media. If newspapers put a lot of effort into reporting about a certain issue, this 
issue is likely to be perceived as more important.20 The power of media in regards 
to shaping the agenda has grown significantly since the development of the 
internet and social media.21 Even so, such a development have not changed the 
principle behind agenda setting. Even in 1938’s Great Britain, most people had 
access to certain information through media, and newspapers, together with radio 
broadcasts, were the main sources of information. 
So, what place does the agenda setting theory have in my research? First of 
all, the framework is an essential part of how I read my material, and was used to 
help me to answer my main research question. Was there any bias concerning the 
agreement and the British role in the negotiations, and if so, in what way?  
Second, the number of articles published any given day gives a certain 
indication on how prioritized the issue of the Munich agreement is. Also, while 
analysing the articles, I can see when, and in what way, different perspectives are 
being brought into consideration. If one newspaper would, for example, write 
page after page filled with positive responses regarding Chamberlain’s role in the 
negotiations, while the Czechoslovakian perspective is left out, that tells us a lot 
about how the paper prioritize what they wish to convey to their readers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20 Kingdon, 2014, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (2nd ed.), p. 57 
21 Buse et al., 2012, Making Health Policy (2nd ed.), p. 77 
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As previously presented, my material consists of local newspapers, which 
reached only a fraction of the British population. This stands in contrast with 
newspapers like The London Times, which potentially reached millions of 
readers.22 Not reaching as many readers, small newspapers does not have the same 
agenda setting potential as bigger newspapers, which might have certain 
ramifications with regards to priorities, bias, etc.  
Of course, since this is not a comparative analysis, where I compare smaller 
newspapers to bigger ones, I cannot provide any results proving (or disproving) 
such a hypothesis. However, this research could provide a basis for such a study. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
22 London population was around 8 million in 1938 
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2 Historical context 
2.1 Re-militarization of the Rhineland, and plans of 
action 
    Ever since the end of the First World War, and the treaty of Versailles, 
Germany had paid dearly for its role in the Great War. Demoralized, demilitarized 
and economically weak, dissatisfaction grew among its citizens. Looking to the 
West, seeing only the capitalist, democratic power forcing them to their knees, 
and to the East, seeing the threat of communism, the growing Nazi party made 
promises of a Greater Germany, which would restore Germany to glory. Even 
though this idea was praised by the German people, they still feared yet another 
devastating war, which opted Adolf Hitler to depict himself as a man of peace.23 
The first act of German expansion took place in March 1936, when Germany 
re-militarized the Rhineland (German: Rheinland). This was in direct violation of 
articles 42 and 43 in the treaty of Versailles, in which it is stated that any military 
presence is forbidden within the demilitarized zone. Violating this agreement 
would be “… regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory to 
the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world”.24 It was also 
in violation of the treaties of Locarno from 1925, which reaffirmed the importance 
of non-aggression and “territorial status quo”.25 This was undoubtedly a risky 
move, and could’ve been answered by French military countermeasures. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
23 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938: The History of the Peace Pact That Failed to 
Prevent World War II, chapter 2: Building a Greater Germany 
24 Treaty of Versailles, 1919, article 44, via https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-
0043.pdf, accessed 2016-11-06 
25  Treaties of Locarno, 1925, article 1 and 2, via 
http://www.fransamaltingvongeusau.com/documents/dl1/h2/1.2.3.pdf, accessed 2016-11-08 
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In addition to France failing to produce any countermeasure, Belgium now 
withdrew from the Locarno pact, and ended their alliance with France and Great 
Britain, weakening the collective defence of the Western powers.26 
Later that year, on November 5th, Hitler held a secret meeting with his top 
military and political advisers, dealing with the issue of war against (mainly) the 
Western powers. For Germany to be victorious in such a war, the Eastern front 
needed to be secured, which would be done by – in one way or another – take 
over Czechoslovakia and “eliminate them from the very beginning”.27 
2.2 Anschluss 
In the beginning of 1938, Hitler’s plans to further expand his Greater Germany 
proceeded. Since the previous year, Austrian Nazis had increased their presence – 
and violence – on the streets of Austria, increasing the pressure on the Austrian 
government. Hitler engaged in what can be considered nothing more than 
blackmailing, by threatening Austrian chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, demanding 
Austria to be absorbed into the Reich. Failure to concede such a transition would 
“force” Hitler to resort to military action.28 
Hitler’s sights on Austria weren’t new, but a previous alliance between 
Austria and Italy delayed any German attempts to intervene. In his war to conquer 
parts of the African continent, Mussolini was plagued by a persistent resistance, 
and asked Hitler for help. Hitler offered to help, but on the condition that Italy left 
its alliance with Austria. Mussolini agreed, thus leaving Austria vulnerable. Being 
abandoned by Italy, Chancellor Schuschnigg  turned to Great Britain for 
guarantees of protection in the event of German aggression, but to no avail.29 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
26 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 267 
27 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 269 
28 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 290ff 
29 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938, chapter 3: Austria and the Anschluss 
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On March 12th, the German army crossed the border into Austria, and it did 
not take long until the country of Austria sized to exist, now being part of Hitler’s 
Third Reich. Once again, the European powers failed to response to the German 
expansion, and it became clear that the British Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, did not show any interest in halting German expansion. 
     Not only did Chamberlain look on while Austria was taken over by Germany, 
but he also made it clear that Great Britain would not guarantee support to 
Czechoslovakia in case of German aggression. Nor would he guarantee that the 
British would stand beside France if the French were called upon to defend 
Czechoslovakia, an obligation given in the Franco-Czech pact.30 With this 
knowledge, Hitler had certain assurances when it came to his future plans for 
Czechoslovakia. 
2.3 The Munich crisis 
     In May 1938, many in Europe feared war. In what came to be called the May 
crisis, the powers of France, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union 
feared a German attack on Czechoslovakia. In response, the Czechs mobilized, 
while Britain, France and the Soviet Union stood united against potential German 
aggression. Even though there were reports of German mobilization along the 
Czechoslovakian border, no such reports could be confirmed.31 However, given 
the prior actions of the Nazi regime, fear of aggression was hardly unfounded. 
Nor was it, in retrospect, any surprise that the aggression later came to fruition.  
     During this crisis, Chamberlain urged the Czech government to grant certain 
autonomy to some minorities in Czechoslovakia, even if this would mean 
secession. Furthermore, the British government were open to the idea of the 
Sudetenland being separated from Czechoslovakia.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
30 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 315 
31 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 323ff 
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Nor was it expected that the Soviets would come to aid Czechoslovakia, in case of 
German aggression.32 The unwillingness to aid Czechoslovakia remained strong, 
and British government officials where blunt, claiming that Czechoslovakia was 
of no concern, and that France would stand alone if they were to support the 
country against German aggression.33 With such clear signals, nothing was to stop 
Hitler from intervening in Czechoslovakia. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
32 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. p. 335f 
33 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938, Chapter 5: Manoeuvring for Czechoslovakia 
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3 Analysis 
 
Before moving on to my analysis, I few words should be mentioned about the 
politics of appeasement which characterized Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy 
prior to the Second World War. As written in the previous chapter, the Germans 
violated the treaties of Versailles and Locarno without any real consequences. 
Fearing a new war in Europe, the Western allies (France, Belgium and Great 
Britain) stood passive in the face of German expansion, and Great Britain, having 
a weak economy, as well as having a far-reaching empire to maintain, had a lot to 
lose in a war. 
The politics of appeasement was not unique for the Anglo-French alliance: the 
League of Nations, while condemning actions such as the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931, did not react to these aggressions, and even though they 
imposed economic sanctions on Italy when Mussolini decided to invade Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) in 1935, the results were very limited.34 Ever since the German policy 
of expansion became apparent, the European democracies – few that they were – 
still wanted to maintain peace almost at any price.35  
 After the de-militarization of the Rhineland, and the Anschluss, Chamberlain 
remained passive, thinking that the best way to avoid a full-scale war is to appease 
the Nazi regime.36 Such politics gave Hitler few reasons not to continue with his 
plans of expansion, and Czechoslovakia was next in line. When the “diplomatic 
clash” in Munich commenced, Britons held their breaths, hoping their Prime 
Minister could maintain peace in Europe. It should though be noted that 
Chamberlain was often an “active appeaser”. That is, he was often engaged in the 
foreign politics, always taking a stand for peace during the threats of war.  
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3.1 Anxiety and fear of war (September 1st – 
September 14th) 
In the beginning of September, 1938, lurking disaster had been avoided. On 
September 2nd, the Exeter and Plymouth Gazette wrote about the situation, and the 
problems regarding German claims on the Sudetenland. Though the tensions were 
decreasing, a threat still persisted. Even so, it would, the author argued, be a 
mistake to assume that all Germans wanted war. More importantly, would they 
really want a war with Great Britain? In any case, the foreign policy of the British 
government were to be commended, and “the British public will […] support the 
Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary in any moves which may be found 
necessary.”37 
The Scotsman provided its readers with much information on the crisis, having 
their own correspondent sending regular updates on the situation. There was no 
doubt in these reports that Hitler was the key figure, having all the power to take 
“a step which may lead to a settlement of the problem, which, more than any other 
at the moment, threatens the peace of Europe.”38 At this stage, the role of the 
British government was limited, and the faith of Europe seemed to depend on the 
actions of Hitler.  
Western Morning News and Daily Gazette put the same emphasis on 
Germany’s advantage on the issue, and their diplomatic correspondent wrote that 
“it is for the German government and Herr Hitler now to say whether real 
negotiations shall begin or whether the crisis shall continue and perhaps 
develop.”39  
The Derry Journal also reported on the issue, stating that the British 
government remained passive, waiting for further developments.40 
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Reports on the situation were scarce the following ten days, and the reports 
first became daily news on September 13th. This was not so much due to 
development of the negotiations regarding the crisis, as it was about the escalation 
of violence in the Sudeten areas. In the wake of this violence, which had resulted 
in the death of several Sudeten Germans, Hitler increased his pressure on the 
Czech government, and the world.  
Western Morning News, reporting on Hitler’s speech to the Nazi congress in 
Nuremberg, stating that it gave “no words to lessen fears of war, no word to 
increase the hopes for peace”.41 Meanwhile, France took measures to meet the 
ever-present threat of war.42  
The Northern Whig and Belfast Post reported about activity in London, where 
people gathered to show solidarity to Czechoslovakia, and to share their strong 
criticism of the Nazi regime. It was written about a letter from “the democratic 
people of London” to an embassy official, which objected to Hitler “insulting […] 
the people of and Government of Czecho-Slovakia, to democracy in general, and 
to Great Britain.”43 
On September 14th, the headlines were all but optimistic. The Western Daily 
Press and Bristol Mirror reported the situation as being the “gravest since 1914”, 
as clashes between Czechoslovakian Nazis and the authorities in several cities 
further increased the tensions between Germany and the Czechoslovakian 
government.44 Sheffield Daily Independent likewise reported about the escalation, 
printing their first page with the headline “Europe ready for war” to convey their 
message of a Europe where “the war clouds are coming nearer”.45  
The ambassador of Czechoslovakia visited (the British) foreign office to 
reassure himself of British and France support in the crisis.46 
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By mid-September, the newspapers were yet to set an agenda for peace, and 
calm the nerves of the citizens. Indeed, by this time, there was no real reason to 
report on the British role in the crisis, as the government remained passive. The 
newspapers were fully aware of the non-existent influence of the British at this 
point. 
3.2 New hope and betrayal (September 15th – 
September 26th) 
On September 15th, Prime Minister Chamberlain travelled to Munich to meet 
with Hitler, and several newspapers saw it fit to put these news on the first page, 
somewhat highlighting the significance of this event. Derby Evening Telegraph 
shared a positive view on this development, reporting that Mr. Chamberlain was 
met with warm greetings in Munich, while crowds of officials, diplomats and 
journalists, waving the Prime Minister goodbye, wished him good luck in his 
endeavour.47 One of these journalists worked for The Gloucester Citizen and 
shared his story, putting into words a glorious send-off of a Prime Minister they 
“have never seen before”, with “the brilliant sunshine full upon him”.48  
For now, the outlook was positive, not only because of the positive outlook of 
Chamberlain’s role, but also because the fact that the German Foreign Minister, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, shared his optimism, not only about negotiating a 
settlement regarding the Sudeten crisis, but also in creating good relationships 
between Germany and Great Britain.49  
Herbert Watson of Portsmouth Evening News wrote about Chamberlain as a 
“sane leader in a mad world” and “supremely the man of peace”, also witnessing 
about the optimism printed all across Britain.50   
Chamberlain’s visit to Munich was short, and he returned home after only one 
day abroad to consult with his ministry. The faith of Czechoslovakia remained 
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unknown, and further negotiations regarding the Sudeten crisis were waiting. The 
Germans had since a while back demanded a referendum to deal with the issue (a 
referendum aiming to get the Sudeten Germans to vote for leaving 
Czechoslovakia), which was promptly denied by the Czechoslovakian 
government.  
However, the future were to be determined by the big powers (Great Britain, 
France and Germany), and if a referendum were to be held, it would be through 
negotiations, and not under threat of German aggression.51 Many speculations 
arose about what was being said during the meeting between Chamberlain and 
Hitler, and the Prime Minister’s quick return to London raised thoughts about 
potential counter-proposals made by Hitler. It was also now the idea of “Four-
Power talk”,52 although tentatively, was reported to become reality in the near 
future.53 
Hitler, who had pushed to have a referendum about Sudeten secession, was 
now reported to have put forth an even harsher ultimatum. According to French 
sources, all Sudeten areas with more than 80 percent (Sudeten) German majority 
should immediately cede to Germany, while areas with more than 50 percent 
Germans should hold a referendum on the issue. If these conditions were not met 
he would, it was reported, use force.54 The same day, France and Britain had 
reached an agreement regarding the issue, opting for a peaceful solution, though 
the policy needed to be developed further.55 
The news of this agreement was reported by several newspapers, such as 
Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette and the Dundee Evening Telegraph 
and Post.56 
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With Chamberlain’s entrance into the negotiations, British newspapers got 
more involved in the issue of the Sudeten crisis. On the 15th of September, the 
number of articles on the subject exceeded, by far, the number of articles 
published the previous ten days. Naturally, with their own Prime Minister entering 
negotiations that could shapes the years to come, the interest increased. The 
invitation of Chamberlain was not only seen as proof of the Germans willingness 
to achieve peace, but also as an acknowledgement of the influence of the British 
Empire. 
With Hitler pushing for incorporating Sudeten territory into the German 
Reich, and the Anglo-French agreement regarding a peaceful solution, the 
situation in Prague looked grim. Being at the mercy of three super-powers, the 
Czechoslovakian government had little choice but to accept any terms put forth. 
All opting for a peaceful solution, the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia 
remained under threat, considering that Hitler’s offer was technically a peaceful 
one.  
By this time, Hitler was no longer willing to negotiate, and the 
Czechoslovakian government, now under great pressure from all sides, stated that 
ceding the Sudetenland to Germany was prohibited under the constitution, and 
that the question should instead be handled by the Hague Tribunal.57 
When the news of the Anglo-French agreement reached the Czechoslovakian 
people, the feeling of betrayal was great. Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror 
wrote about disheartened citizens feeling that their country had been “sold to the 
enemy […] by the nations which for 20 years they had regarded as their closest 
allies and friends” to avoid war.58  
Meanwhile, criticism rose among some British politicians. Winston Churchill, 
who wanted the British to take a firm stand against the Nazis, shared the view of 
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betrayal, and said that “the idea that safety can be purchased by throwing a small 
State to the wolves is a fatal delusion”.59 
There were also reports about small protests against the British stance on the 
issue, where a small number of people gathered in Whitehall (a district in 
Westminster), displaying posters with messages as “Britain’s honour lost to-day 
will mean Britain’s peace lost to-morrow”.60 Northern Whig and Belfast Post 
wrote about Emanuel Shinwell, Labour politician and Member of Parliament 
(M.P.), who was critical towards the British position, sharing the position that the 
policy of Chamberlain was a betrayal. He went further, claiming that the greatest 
danger was “the gradual weakening of democracy and the readiness to yield to 
force” and that it was the “blackest chapter in British diplomatic history.”61  
Clement Atlee, leader of the Labour party (and future Prime Minister), saw 
Chamberlain’s actions as something that “profoundly shocked British public 
opinion”, and recalled the Labour party’s declaration that “the British 
Government must leave no doubt in the mind of the German Government that it 
will unite with French and Soviet Governments to resist any attack upon Czecho-
Slovakia”, claiming that a more firm stance against Germany would have the 
support of the public.62 Still, Chamberlain maintained his position, saying that 
“we must still make great efforts to save the peace of Europe.”63 Even so, it was 
still Hitler who held all the cards. 
 
 
 
Hitler had given Chamberlain a memorandum, where he explained his view on 
the Sudeten problem, which were to be forwarded to the Czechoslovakian 
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government. Chamberlain also seemed eager to return to London, so that he could 
initiate talks with his Government about the developments.64  
As the crisis progressed, and Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement continued 
to dominate British foreign politics, newspaper now made room for opposition. 
With several prominent politicians taking a firm stance against the appeasement 
of Hitler, the reports were no longer completely positive or completely negative. 
The public was now given two sides: the continued prospects for peace, where 
Chamberlain would be a key figure, and the stances of those viewing the 
appeasement as treachery (against Czechoslovakia), and a risk, rather than an 
opportunity.  
3.3 A new meeting (September 28th – September 
29th) 
On September 28th, hope was on the rise. It was widely reported that, in the 
middle of a speech given by Chamberlain in the House of Commons, the Premier 
had received an invitation to meet with Hitler to discuss the crisis. The Gloucester 
Citizen wrote about how “every government supporter sprang to his feet and cheer 
after cheer for the Prime Minister rang out while members again demonstrated by 
waving official papers.”65 Portsmouth Evening News reported “remarkable 
revelations”, informing their readers that Chamberlain had once again been 
invited to Munich to negotiate.66  
 
 
In the Dundee Evening Telegraph, it was written about “the wrong turning”, 
where the situation was compared to that of 1914, when then foreign secretary of 
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Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey, did his very best to prevent war, and turn Europe 
towards more cooperation. Just as Grey had failed, so could Chamberlain.67 
Thursday, September 29th 1938, was met with enormous expectations. The 
“four-power talk” were to take place in Munich, where Adolf Hitler would host 
the leaders of Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain), France (Édouard Daladier), 
and Italy (Benito Mussolini). J. L. Hodson wrote in the Aberdeen Press and 
Journal, wrote about “the four men […] who will shape your life and mine”, 
speculating how the four leaders would shape the times to come. He wrote about 
Chamberlain as a man with two sides, stating that… 
“We saw him in action yesterday – calm, unruffled, steady, taking almost in his stride the 
shaping of great history, turning from gloom to that tremendous ray of hope that burst upon us 
– taking it more calmly than most of those who listened to that modest, most untheatrical 
voice and manner. But we also heard him over the wireless, too – deeply stirred, deeply 
indignant, that a world might be plunged to destruction because of failure to settle details of a 
controversy already largely disposed of.”68 
He went on, imagining how the meeting would go, and what role the Prime 
Minister would come to play in the negotiations. Chamberlain was depicted as a 
logical man, and a lover of birds, flowers and music. Hitler was described as a 
dreamer, a “prince of demagogues” that can “exercise a powerful effect on all 
who meets him”, be it through the ruthlessness he showed towards Schuschnigg 
before the Anschluss, or the charming greetings of Mr. Chamberlain.69 
The Dundee Evening Telegraph, also writing about the meeting that would 
take place, wrote that if Europe were to escape the lures of war, it would be the 
fine temper and pertinacity of Mr. Chamberlain that would, more than anything, 
carry the day.70  
Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail shared with its readers words from Australian 
Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, who commended Chamberlain’s “superhuman 
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efforts” in the negotiations.71 The Hull Daily Mail quoted an article from The 
Rand Daily Mail, based in Johannesburg, where Chamberlain was praised for his 
efforts, and that if the problem was solved, it would “earn for him the everlasting 
gratitude of the nation which has produced so noble a son.”72 
Raymond Burns, being published in both the Portsmouth Evening News and 
Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, shared his notion that it was 
“inconceivable” that the negotiations in Munich would fail, and that the meeting 
in Munich illustrated “a cardinal point in British post-War foreign policy – 
discussion of differences among the leaders of the four Western Powers”. Despite 
the obvious optimism in the article, Burns did acknowledge that there were still 
issues at hand, he maintained the position that the meeting in Munich would 
indeed be a step away from war.73  
This optimism wasn’t shared by all, not even, it would seem, the editors of 
Portsmouth Evening News. The headlines on the following page told a different 
story, where teachers and authorities worried about what would become of the 
30,000 school children of Portsmouth in the event of war, and gas masks were 
distributed across the city.74 
In a short article in Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, one could 
read about the crisis on the accounts of two American cabaret artists, Earl Leslie 
and Flora Duane, who had come from Berlin to London. They told of the 
Germans as a people that did not want to fight, and that Mr. Chamberlain was 
regarded “in the light of a hero through whom peace would come.”75  
 
On the same page, another article presented Chamberlain as a “remarkable 
statesman” who had in the past three weeks “established himself as one of the 
three or four greatest men in British history.” The author shared Burns’ notion that 
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it was hard to see how negotiations could fail, and finished the text with “God 
bless Chamberlain. And God speed”.76 
The Scotsman, having their own correspondent in Prague, offered another 
perspective on the issue. In a short, but blunt, article, the author wrote about the 
scepticism among officials in Czechoslovakia. He wrote that: 
“Czechoslovakia would have liked to hear Mr Chamberlain explaining how the map which 
was drawn up by Herr Hitler would create, in place of this solid and selfcontained Republic, 
something that could not be called so much a State as a sort of native reserve in Central Europe in 
which Czechoslovak people would be allowed to eke out an existence entirely at Germany’s 
mercy.”77 
Not only did this offer a perspective so distinct from the “at home” optimism, 
but also told a story about the thoughts of the British appeasement of Hitler and 
his aspirations. The author further made rhetorical points regarding the feelings of 
the Czechoslovakian people and its leader, and how the country stood almost 
forgotten, anxious, and praying for protection, while the big powers were to 
discuss its fate. 
Back in London, not much was needed to lift the spirits of the citizens. The 
London correspondent of Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer wrote about how 
the people of London, when reached by the news of a new meeting in Munich, 
went from a disheartened state to a state of calm and good spirit. After some grim 
days, laughter had once again returned to the streets of the capital.78 
 
 
As with the previous two weeks of reporting, newspapers conveyed both 
positive and negative opinions about the current situation, although the positive 
certainly outweighed the negative. The Czechoslovakian perspective was almost 
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lost, and was it not for The Scotsman, the picture reaching the public would be 
that of promise of peace, and a picture of their Prime Minister’s potential heroism. 
Still, it was these promises that reached the general public, and with 
Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette and Yorkshire Post and Leeds 
Intelligencer writing about the positive mood in London, the obvious agenda was 
to raise the spirits of the readers. With the meeting only hours away, expectations 
were high, and despite some doubts among a few authors, optimism dominated 
the news reports. 
3.4 “Peace for our time” (September 30th – October 
1st) 
In the early hours of September 30th, what was to be called the Munich 
Agreement was signed by Neville Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler 
and Benito Mussolini. With the agreement, Germany was granted the right to cede 
the Sudeten German territories, and that Czechoslovakian presence would be 
continuously withdrawn until 10th of October, when the territory would be under 
German dominion. In this agreement, it was also conceded that all Sudeten 
German political prisoners should be released within four weeks.79  
This, naturally, became the big news of the day in Great Britain, and once 
again, Prime Minister Chamberlain was hailed as a hero. Thousands of telegrams 
and letters were sent to Chamberlain’s residence, thanking him “for his work in 
the cause of peace”, and the bells of Westminster Abbey would ring its bells to 
welcome the return of the Prime Minister.80  
In the same spirit of cheerfulness, the Dundee Evening Telegraph reported 
about “a dawn of peace” in London, where people no longer had “drawn and 
anxious faces”.81 
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Though recognizing the success in what had been achieved, The Dundee 
Courier and Advertiser were a bit more restrained in their optimism, writing that 
“… for the time being, at any rate, the black shadow of war has passed away” and 
that “there will be a renewal of the outcry that a democratic country has been 
surrendered to the Dictators”. However, the author also concludes that the 
agreement is far better than the “unspeakable alternative of delivering over 
millions of human beings to slaughter.”82 
The Gloucester Citizen did not hold back in its praise of their Prime Minister. 
On the front pace, in large, capital letters, it read “PREMIER’S TRIUMPH”, and 
that peace had now been preserved. The paper praised Chamberlain, writing that 
“our great Prime Minister has worked incessantly, when all others had well nigh 
despaired, for the peace which we owe alike to his initiative, his sagacity and his 
persistence.”83 
Portsmouth Evening News were also adamant in their support and 
acknowledgement of Chamberlain’s role in the negotiation process. Though some 
credit was given to the other three leaders, Chamberlain was put on the highest of 
pedestals, even receiving the credit for “bringing about the meeting and paving 
way for Peace”. The praise continued, and it was written that “history will reserve 
a special niche for the English Prime Minister, who saw the world slipping into 
war, and unhesitatingly took bold, resolute, courageous, unprecedented steps to 
stop the descent and save civilization from ruin all too plainly impending” .84  
 
 
The Western Times shares a similar admiration for their Prime Minister, 
writing that “thus, once again, has Mr. Chamberlain’s efforts to find a real peace, 
been appreciated by the very man who seemed bent on war.”85 In truth, all knew, 
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for it was fresh in memory, that it was Hitler who brought about the meeting when 
he extended his invitation to Chamberlain. 
Great Britain itself was also commended, for its calm and resolution during 
the crisis. “Great Britain is still not afraid if being great” and “a weak Britain 
would be a danger to the world […] and any nation which may dream of 
aggression or wantonly provoke disorder is thus warned that there is one great 
force on the side of Peace which cannot be either ignored or overawed”.86 In the 
same paper, on the same page, Herbert Watson also praised Prime Minister 
Chamberlain, as well as the nation as a whole. Chamberlain’s accomplishments 
wasn’t only a great achievement on behalf of Great Britain, but a victory for all 
mankind.87 So harmonious was the situation in fact, that children in Bradford had 
seized gas masks, previously distributed as a precaution, using them as toys, 
simulating war in the trenches that had been dug to protect from potential air 
raids.88 
The Scotsman’s correspondent in Prague once again tried to convey a 
Czechoslovakian perspective, pointing out that they had no say in the negotiations 
which would shape the future of their country. While Londoners cheered on the 
streets, celebrating the peace so courageously secured by their Prime Minister, the 
hopes of peace were nowhere near the minds of the Czechoslovakian people. At 
the centre of the dispute, the general opinion was “that Mr Chamberlain does not 
in the least understand the type of man he is dealing with in Herr Hitler, and is 
allowing himself to be misled by facile optimism.”89 
 
Not surprisingly, September 30th was seen as a great day for Great Britain. 
War had been averted, and there was no doubt among journalists and editors 
around the country who was the man of the hour. Their Prime Minister had 
returned not only with a solution to the Sudeten problem, bringing an end to the 
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crisis which had haunted Europe for months, but also with a document that would 
guarantee peace between Germany and Great Britain. 
Once again, it was The Scotsman who provided a dissenting view, giving the 
impression that it was Hitler who won, and not the British. For others, the agenda 
was to put Chamberlain, and in extension the British people, at the centre. After 
the meeting in Munich on the 30th, Chamberlain had visited Hitler three times in 
less than three weeks. Not once had Hitler come to London, and not once had 
Hitler conceded to any counter-proposals that would give him any less than 
dominion over the Sudeten areas. Yet, the “reality” conveyed by the newspapers 
where almost in unison regarding Chamberlain’s diplomatic prowess. 
As a new month commenced, news of the agreement kept on dominating the 
newspapers. Like so many others, The Dundee Courier and Advertiser raised 
Chamberlain to hero status. The unwavering willingness of the government, and 
among the British people, were surely admirable, but it was the Prime Minister 
who should be the recipient of the praise. However, it was not only Chamberlain’s 
efforts in itself that earned him credit. Going to war to challenge the German 
claim would, the author argued, be going to war for a bad cause. The author goes 
as far as to say that Hitler had an “unchallengeable right on his side”, and that the 
very creation of the Czechoslovakian republic after the First World War was “one 
of the great blunders, if not one of the crimes, of the war treaties.”90 
Of course, the seemingly endless cheers for the Prime Minister was not only 
due to the Munich Agreement, but also due to the freshly signed (By Hitler and 
Chamberlain) Anglo-German no-war pact, which would secure peace between the 
two great powers.  
With one visit to Munich, Chamberlain had not only brought the Sudeten 
crisis to an end, but had also made sure that the people of Great Britain need not 
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fear war, Sudeten crisis or not. It was, as Chamberlain put it, “peace in our 
time”.91 
Some remained sceptical, however. In the Gloucester Citizen, one author 
wondered why the Home Secretary asked the people to go on with the Air Raid 
Precautions (ARP), why gas masks were still distributed and why the trenches that 
had been dug should not be filled in. The author worried there was perhaps “some 
unexpected hitch […] lurking somewhere in the shadows to cheat all our hopes, to 
undermine confidence, to withhold the final ratification of the Munich Peace Pact, 
and even plunge Europe into war?”92  
The Gloucester Citizen was one of several newspapers to offer more than 
praise, and the Czechoslovakian sacrifice was not ignored. One of few European 
democracies were now to cede territory to the German dictatorship, and the author 
noted that it was just as much a surrender to the intimidations of Hitler, as it was a 
victory: “The power and the will of the German dictator has prevailed over the 
will of the free people…”93 This was one of a few, often short, articles dealing 
with a Czechoslovakian perspective. More often than not, the voices 
acknowledging the sacrifice made by, or rather imposed on, the small republic, 
were all but lost in the deafening cheers of the British people celebrating the peace 
secured by their Prime Minister. 
Some newspapers also made space for criticism from other members of 
Parliament, such as Harold Nicholson, member of the National Labour party, who 
considered the signing of the Munich agreement a surrender, and that it would 
only give peace for six months. Instead, Nicolson had hoped that Chamberlain 
would have taken a “firm line” in Munich, to show the world that democratic faith 
was stronger than fascist conceptions.  
Instead, Britain succumbed to German pressure, betraying “a valiant little 
country and a great democratic idea.”94 Meanwhile, the Gloucestershire Echo 
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reported that Duff Cooper, a long-time critic of the appeasement policy of 
Chamberlain, resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty, as a protest to the Munich 
Agreement.95 
The Scotsman dedicated almost four pages to the new developments, and 
despite the “good news”, the peace was viewed more as a result of 
Czechoslovakian surrender, than as something achieved by Chamberlain and the 
other leaders. By “turning the other cheek”, it was indeed Czechoslovakia that 
prevented war, since turning down the agreement would result in war.  
Even so, the wisdom and tenacity of Chamberlain was commended, as there 
was nothing he could have done to save Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Munich 
agreement was necessary to negotiate a lasting peace. Not only was it seen as a 
fair trade to give the Sudeten areas to Germany in exchange for peace, but the 
very existence of Czechoslovakia was put into question: “It suited French policy 
in 1919 to make Czechoslovakia as powerful as possible to be a guard upon 
Germany’s southeast flank […] Was it worth a European war to confirm and 
repeat the mistakes of the Peace Conference?”96 
On the issue of Czechoslovakia, the correspondent in Prague had other 
thoughts than the author of the article cited above. The sacrifice which was 
deemed necessary by Britain brought nothing but despair to Czechoslovakia. The 
correspondent wrote:“To the bitterness of this humiliation and defeat at the hands 
of friends and allies is added resentment at the manner with which it was carried 
out by a coalition of the four Powers who, it is felt here, have now imposed 
Hitler’s will on Czechoslovakia”.97  
 
Arthur Berriedale Keith, a professor at Edinburgh University, shares his 
criticism of the agreement with the readers of The Scotsman. Keith saw the 
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agreement as the final step to grant Germany hegemony in Europe, and saw 
Chamberlain’s actions as a submission to Hitler.98 
Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror wrote of “three great scenes without 
precedence in the history of statesmanship” when describing the homecoming of 
Chamberlain. Despite the pouring rain, ten thousand people were reported to have 
greeted the Prime Minister when he returned from Munich, to declare “peace for 
our time”. The cheers seemed endless, when the people of Britain welcomed the 
man who not only settled the Sudeten dispute, but brought with him a document 
that would guarantee peace between Great Britain and Germany for years to 
come.99 
While Britain, and almost the rest of the world, celebrated the news, the 
people of Czechoslovakia was in a state of mourning. A Reuter telegram reported 
that people tried to hold demonstrations in the streets of Prague, and the radio 
silence, which was initiated as a sign of national mourning, was only disturbed by 
the occasional news report.100 
In The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, the views of a few citizens, 
regarding the Munich agreement and the newly signed peace pact between Great 
Britain and Germany, were shared. The bishop of Exeter called it the triumph of 
reason, and that the 30th of September 1938 was “a greater day even than 
November 11”. Several prominent people, among them aldermen and mayors, 
also shared their gratitude and optimism, praising their Prime Minister and the 
peace he had secured.101 There was no doubt that this was a day for celebration. 
 
 
The day after the agreement was signed, the consensus regarding the 
achievements of Chamberlain was challenged. No doubt, the newspapers still put 
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their emphasis on the peace which was now, at least to many, “guaranteed”, but 
dissenting opinions, especially from politicians, got its fair share of publicity. It 
would seem that several newspapers now wanted to change the view on 
Czechoslovakia as “a faraway country”, and offer perspectives that was so close 
to home. However, if one took part of such perspectives or not was highly 
dependent on location, as some newspapers (such as Western Daily Mail and 
Daily Gazette) still focused heavily on Chamberlain’s achievement and global 
acclaim. 
3.5 Days of justification – and criticism (October 3rd 
– October 7th) 
On Monday, October 3rd, there was a change of pace with regards to the criticism 
ventilated through several newspapers. In The Yorkshire Post and Leeds 
Intelligencer, Eleonore Rathbone, independent M.P. and critic of the politics of 
appeasement, wrote that “only time can show fully what kind and duration of 
peace has been bought and what price will be paid for it by the Czechs, ourselves, 
and the world”. With regards to the resulting refugee crisis, she continued: 
“At a time when Mr. Chamberlain’s influence stands so high, much may depend on what he is 
prepared to do for these victims of his policy, whether by exerting his own influence or through 
the instructions he gives to those who are to take part on our behalf in the execution of his plan. 
And his actions may depend on how far public opinion at home is aroused on behalf of these 
victims – these scapegoats by whose sacrifice some hope to have obtained immunity from the 
tragedy of war”.102 
 
 
James H. Mosey, Chairman of Gilling A.R.P. Committee, called the 
agreement unjust, saying that “no agreement can be just that is forced at the point 
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of a bayonet” and that “the Czechoslovak people are paying the price for our 
respite…”. He urged other (A.R.P.) committees to send proposals to M.P’s, the 
Prime Minister and the opposition, to “insist that an immediate world conference 
[…] examine all maladjustments, economic, racial, social and political which 
interfere with the right-living of the peoples of the world”, as he did not wish the 
Czechoslovakian people to be the only ones to make sacrifices for peace.103 
Hugh R. Lupton from Leeds sent a copy of a letter, meant for M.P. Osbert 
Peake, to the newspaper, which got published. The letter contained a proposal to 
reconstruct the Government, and some of the criticism went as follows: 
“I am writing to inform you that I disagree with the action lately taken by the 
Prime Minister and shall, if you continue to support his policy, be unable again to 
record my vote in your favour”. He continues: 
“… Although our failure to support the cause of Czechoslovakia has filled me with such 
shame in respect of my country as I never thought to experience, the main cause of my dissent is 
the short-sightedness of the action taken. It must be obvious to the whole world that the Sudeten 
grievances were deliberately formatted by Hitler as a means to achieve his ends”.104 
A text signed with the name C. E. G. Spencer also questioned the actions 
taken by Chamberlain: “Try as we may to conceal it, the fact remains that that war 
has been averted by surrender to threats of force, and the peace gained has been 
won by substituting one injustice for another”. Philip R. Le Mesurier sent the 
newspaper a copy of a telegram he had sent to the Prime Minister. The telegram 
was short and concise: “Deplore utterly your latest surrender to German 
dictation”.  
 
Charles Davy from Kent wrote: “We must not try to justify our part in 
demanding these sacrifices; this must be left for history to decide”, while also 
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sharing his admiration for the Czechs, who had “given the world superb example 
of courage and social discipline.”105  
The Dundee Evening Telegraph wrote an article about Duff Cooper, who had 
previously resigned in response to the Munich Agreement. Cooper had now given 
up on his political career, but stated that “I have maintained something which is to 
me of great value. I can still walk about the world with my head erect.”106 
Excerpts of Cooper’s speech in the House of Commons was also published in 
Hull Daily Mail and The Sunderland Echo and Shipping Gazette.107 
Meanwhile, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette went another way, 
focusing on the positive. The Bishop of Plymouth thanked God, and Chamberlain, 
for the peace, and the Plymouth Conservative Club had sent a telegram to their 
Prime Minister, informing him of their “heartfelt gratitude to you as 
peacemaker.”108 
The most negative words shared by the paper was those written by Isaac Foot, 
who felt that the agreement had resulted in “relief and shame”, seeing the actions 
taken as a necessary evil.109 In The Aberdeen Press and Journal “King’s message 
of thanks to the nation” adorned the top of page 7, with several positive stories on 
the recent developments. The King himself praised Chamberlain, stating that 
“after the magnificent efforts of the Prime Minister in the cause of peace, it is my 
fervent hope that a new era of friendship and prosperity may be dawning among 
the peoples of the world.”110  
The words of General Jan Smuts were also shared, and Smuts had stated that 
“Mr Chamberlain appeared at the last moment to save the world from war”.111 
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The Gloucester Citizen had a somewhat different approach, giving much focus 
to Germany’s entrance into the Sudetenland, where Hitler was greeted with cheers 
and flowers.112 Like several other newspapers on October 3rd, they also reported 
Duff Cooper’s resignation.113 The editor of the paper also received multiple letters 
that were published regarding the matter. Signed C. F. England, the author shared 
his “immeasurable admiration and gratitude […] towards the supreme and self-
sacrificing effort of the Prime Minister”.114  
Like some of the aforementioned newspapers, The Scotsman also shared some 
views of the readers. Many wrote to The Scotsman, praising both the Prime 
Minister and the Czechs. Writing under the signature “One of complete 
insignificance”, one author called the Munich agreement “infamous”, seeing it as 
a moment where Britain had chosen to “accelerate our humiliating retreat before 
the dictators”, ending the piece with “The sun of Great Britain is not setting 
gloriously, but in a dark and cloudy sky”. William M. C. Stewart, just like others 
before him, called the agreement a betrayal of Czechoslovakia, but also took 
comfort in the voices of those critical to the agreement.115 
At this time, it was clear that the agenda had been changed to represent a more 
nuanced discourse about the Munich agreement. Now, more than ever before, 
several newspapers made way for extensive criticism of the agreement. It 
represented a clear change, and the after celebrations had toned down, a more 
critical debate opened up. Papers still had room for praise, but it was still negative 
publicity that characterized the publications of October 3rd. 
 
On October 4th, The Hull Daily Mail published two texts containing answers 
to some of the criticism. One article conveyed the opinions of Sir Lambert Ward, 
who saw it fit to look back to the treaties of 1919, asking if the very creation of 
the Czechoslovakian republic was a wise choice at all. Ward had stated that “I do 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
112 ”Hitler enters Sudetenland in triumph”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 1 
113 ”Mr. Duff Cooper on his resignation”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 1 
114 ”Other people’s views: The peace – and after”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 4 
115 ”Points of View – After Munich”, The Scotsman, 03-10-1938, p. 13 
  39 
not think the Peace Treaty made the best of the somewhat inflammable material at 
its disposal, especially about the setting up of the State of Czechoslovakia.”116 
Another, shorter, article also contained similar criticism, where the legitimacy of 
Czechoslovakia was questioned, while Chamberlain was commended for his 
achievement, as it at least secured the existence of the Czechoslovakian state. The 
author wrote that: 
“The critics would have us remain at the status quo in Czechoslovakia despite the fact that for 
19 years certain terms of the Versailles peace, including the creation of Czechoslovakia with 
impossibly large minorities on military considerations only, have been the cause of European 
unrest and danger.”117 
Several other papers, including The Northern Whig and Belfast Post and Sheffield 
Daily Independent, had big headlines, followed with extensive texts containing 
criticism of the agreement, among them statements from Duff Cooper.118  
The Aberdeen Press and Journal reported on the debate in the House of 
Commons, where Chamberlain faced criticism from other members of Parliament. 
Chamberlain had not responded directly to this criticism, but rather talked about 
“the facts”, while having overwhelming support in the House.119 They also shared 
a short text written letter from a Czech member of the International Council of 
Women, in which it was stated that “we have been betrayed by our friends to 
whom we have been faithful. You have betrayed us because you have been afraid 
of force”. The letter ended with the words “I am proud of being a Czech. I am 
ashamed of being a European.”120  
The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, as well as The Western Morning 
News and Daily Gazette, also reported on the political debate within the House of 
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Commons, reporting on the praise of Chamberlain and the criticism from Duff 
Cooper alike.121  
The Scotsman also reported on the debate, through their private correspondent. 
In his report, he wrote about the wide support Chamberlain had in the House of 
Commons, while also reporting “unmannerly interruptions” from the Socialists, 
further stating that Chamberlain was not deserving the accusations put forth by his 
critics.122 The paper also made way for some of their readers to put forth their 
opinion. Some praised the Prime Minister, while others criticized the agreement. 
Some also saw it fit to sympathize with the Czechs, and help them in their hour of 
desperate need. 
A text signed by Hector Macpherson declared it “unfortunate that so many of 
your [The Scotsman] correspondents have rushed into print so hastily to criticise 
the Prime Minister and to denounce the Munich Agreement”. He suggested that 
the writers should ask themselves what would have been a reasonable alternative. 
At the same time, he also acknowledged that the current state in Europe was 
problematic, due to British and French passiveness during the mid-30’s, when 
Hitler violated the treaty of Versailles and reintroduced conscription. Even so, 
what was done was done, and the Munich agreement was a necessity, and 
Chamberlain should be commended for his work.123 
 
 
 
 
On October 5th, The Dundee Courier and Advertiser published an article, with 
the agreement, and the subsequent debate, in focus. The author argued that the 
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agreement was not only a step forward, but went so far as to say “that of all the 
beneficiaries of the settlement the Czechoslovak people have been the chief” and 
that the monetary support the British would now give to the country was an act of 
sympathy for a people that “had yielded to natural impulses and rejected the 
Munich proposals”.124 
The Gloucester Echo printed a letter to the editor, where the author 
commented on the German claims on the Sudetenland. It was argued that “Hitler’s 
policy to bring about a homogenous Germany is understandable and legitimate”, 
and that the problem was within Czechoslovakia, a land that was “carved out of 
the old ramshackle Austrian Empire” and where “the two races were on bad 
terms”. In another letter, Chamberlain was praised and the author wrote that 
“surely, the nation will express its approval of the extraordinary energy and 
diplomacy of its Prime Minister by suitable reward for his success in averting an 
unprecedented national disaster”.  
In another letter, however, the government was called a pacifist party “which 
gives in at the moment a bully shakes his fist in its face, and that the agreement 
did not result in peace with honour, but rather “a truce with dishonour”.125 
The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer also shared some of the readers’ 
views on the agreement. One reader, professing himself as “an ordinary man in 
the street, with first-hand experience of the horrors of the last war”, protested 
against the criticism against Chamberlain. Once again, the very creation of 
Czechoslovakia was questioned, and the heterogonous population, among them 
many (Sudeten) Germans, was seen as a cause of conflict. The author finished his 
text by claiming that Chamberlain was “entitled to the generous and unreserved 
support of all men of good will”.  
Another reader called it “a time of national humiliation” and “a shameful 
business” that the Prime Minister had bent to the will of Germany. Others shared 
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their gratitude towards Czechoslovakia, wanting to see people come together to 
help in what way they could.126 
In The Hull Daily Mail, Diana Spearman, a candidate for the Conservatives, 
praised Chamberlain’s achievement, and that one was to be deeply thankful for 
“the disappearance of the nightmare of war”. She put forth a utilitarian argument, 
stating that even though Czechoslovakia had made a great sacrifice, peace in 
Europe was to be the prime objective. She also argued that the disadvantages of 
Czechoslovakia had been “wildly exaggerated in some quarters”. Was it not for 
the settlement, Czechoslovakia would, she argued, be the first (and worst) sufferer 
in the event of war.127  
At this point, there had been a drastic change regarding the content of 
published material. Critics no longer seemed to be dissenters, and in some papers, 
the negative views on the agreement outweighed the positive. While unity was the 
dominating characteristic when the news of the agreement first reached the 
newspapers, publications now shaped a reality where politicians and citizens alike 
seemed divided over the question. Of course, within Parliament, the support for 
Chamberlain seemed to still dominate the debate, but there was no doubt that the 
agreement had created conflict, which was also manifested through the 
newspapers. 
 
 
 
 
On October 6th, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer wrote two whole 
pages on the aftermath of the agreement. Winston Churchill was quoted on 
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several occasions, and he had called the settlement a “total, unmitigated defeat”. 
He had also shared his worries about the future, warning about the growing 
German army, asking “if the Nazi Dictator should choose to look Westward, as he 
may, then bitterly will France and England regret the loss of that vast army of 
ancient Bohemia…”.128 Churchill’s notions were met with considerable resistance 
from other politicians, where Sir Henry Page Croft stated that Britain had not lost 
any prestige, but rather that it was viewed as “the saviour of the world” by some 
nations, and Thomas Magnay seconded the opinions of those pointing out the 
problems regarding the creation of the Czechoslovakian state.129 
October 7th, just about a week after the agreement was signed, The Western 
Gazette shared the views of a few larger, national newspapers. From The Times, 
praised the leadership of Chamberlain, saying that he had made way for a future 
where threats of war had been removed. The nation was to show gratitude to their 
Prime Minister. The Daily Herald had commented on Chamberlain’s role in the 
negotiations, writing that “for the first time he [Hitler] has had to realise that there 
are more forces in the world more powerful than the absolute will of a 
dictator”.130  
In The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, in a text signed E. H. Baxter, 
criticism was directed to democracy itself. Like others before, the creation of 
Czechoslovakia was brought into question, as it was seen as a result of when 
“President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George arranged the map of Europe to their 
satisfaction.”131  
 
 
The writer blamed the League of Nations, the No More War Movement, the 
Socialists and the Liberals for putting Great Britain in a situation where they “had 
no friends, no influence, and no certainty that we could even defend ourselves”. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
128 ”Danger to Britain and France”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 06-10-1938, p. 8 
129 ”Sir H. Page Croft’s Reply to Mr. Churchill”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 06-10-1938, p. 9 
130 ”Opinions of the press”, The Western Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 16 
  44 
The heterogeneity of Czechoslovakia was also pointed out as an issue, since 
“democracy is not very kind to minorities.”132  
The Essex Chronicle published a few letters to the editor, dealing with the 
Munich agreement. One writer the Prime minister for his courage in securing 
peace, while another expressed his gratitude and payed “tribute to his wisdom and 
great statesmanship” calling Chamberlain “our [Britain’s] Abraham Lincoln”. 
Another writer criticized the agreement, writing that “Mr. Chamberlain seemed 
determined to save the face and prestige of Hitler” and that “the only sure way for 
the preservation of world peace is for the people of Britain to make a joint 
declaration to stand alongside the people of France, the Soviet Union, and 
Czechoslovakia against Hitler’s threats…”133 
The Scotsman published a text, containing a report from their Parliamentary 
correspondent, summarizing Chamberlain’s defence of the critique that was now 
directed at him from, among others, Winston Churchill. The author called 
Chamberlain’s speech “To-day’s outstanding event”, also showing that the 
support of Chamberlain’s policy still had extensive support in Parliament.134 
Western Morning News and Daily Gazette also hinted at the wide support of 
Chamberlain, writing that “Mr. Churchill seemed quite surprised at the warmth of 
the cheering when the Prime Minister rebuked him today”.135 
The Northern Whig and Daily Gazette also shared with its readers a few letters 
to the editor. One of these letters questioned the underlying argument regarding 
the German claims on the Sudetenland. 
The author argued that this claim was weak, as areas granted to the Germans 
through the Munich agreement never belonged to Germany, but Bohemia.136 
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Another letter agreed that Czechoslovakia was indeed the biggest loser of the 
agreement, but that the actions of Chamberlain was that “of a great realist”.137 
By this time, the division between those for and against the agreement and 
Chamberlain’s foreign policy, had become abundantly clear. The objective reality, 
that is, the support of Chamberlain in Parliament, was reported as it was, although 
some aspects of the debates were excluded in the reports. Letters sent to the 
editors of the different newspapers showed a reality where the people were deeply 
divided. The variation of opinions was greater, from unconditional praising of 
Chamberlain, to the criticism towards how Britain had betrayed Czechoslovakia 
and bowed to Hitler’s extortions. 
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4 Conclusions 
 
Looking at the general tendencies in the reporting during September and early 
October, there have been some, albeit not extensive, differences in the reporting in 
the different newspapers. Of course, the reports are skewed in a direction where 
the British perspective is dominant, especially when it comes to texts written by 
journalists and editors on respective newspaper. This is in no way a surprising 
result, and absence of such a bias would be extraordinary. A basic assumption 
within agenda setting theory is that the reality is, at least not fully, reported. 
Indeed, covering all there is to cover would be impossible, which opts media 
outlets to prioritize. 
This process can be seen as a filtering system, which is used to filter reality, 
and shape it, before conveying it. In this way, the specific newspaper can control 
what will reach the public. Today, in a digital society, we are constantly 
bombarded with information from thousands and thousands of sources, and can 
often compose our own view of reality, based on several sources. However, in 
1938, the situation was radically different. With fewer media outlets, the “power 
over reality” was far more concentrated. 
Looking back at McCombs and Shaw, their study about how media attention 
affects voters can be compared to the reports written by editors and journalists, 
and how it affects the readers. In this way, the letters that were sometimes sent 
into different newspapers might also be shaped by the nature of the reporting of a 
specific newspaper. 
Northern Whig and Belfast Post published several reports and articles where 
criticism of Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement was prominent. Several 
M.P’s critical of the agreement were quoted and the Czechoslovakian perspective 
was, in extension, brought to light. 
The Scotsman stands out with their use of a Czechoslovakian perspective. 
Having their own correspondent in Prague, they offer a unique perspective on the 
crisis, especially during the most intense period around the end of September, 
when the agreement was signed. 
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In addition to this, several articles focusing on the imposition on 
Czechoslovakia were printed. This seemed to affect the readers, as many shared 
their criticism of the agreement. This focus, which was consistent through the 
crisis, and afterwards, was noticed by one of the readers, who sent a letter, 
criticising The Scotsman for publishing so much criticism towards Chamberlain. 
Until the days following the signing, most newspapers were characterized by a 
plethora of emotions. The balance between hopes of peace and fear of war was 
often uncanny, as the intensity of conflict increased. The hope was based on a 
great belief in the diplomatic skills of Chamberlain, and the fear was based on the 
threatening rhetoric that had been used by Hitler. During this period, the “filtered 
reality” of the newspapers can be summarized by “hope for the best, prepare for 
the worst”. Reports and information conserving the digging of trenches and 
distribution of gas masks, while cheering Chamberlain’s efforts, is a clear 
indication of this. 
Other than this, the main differences does not lie between the different 
newspapers, but rather between different publishing dates. The criticism towards 
the agreement was widely reported in almost all of the newspapers, and letters to 
editors often shared the criticism of different M.P’s (such as Churchill and the 
newly resigned Duff Cooper). The relative optimism prior to this change could 
perhaps be attributed to a form of “collective euphoria” among both citizens and 
the media, celebrating the peace brought home by their Prime Minister. It could 
also be a way for the media to calm down their readers, as to create tranquillity 
among the British people. As my analysis did not explore differences using an 
ideological perspective (that is, searching for differences between newspapers 
with different ideological standpoints), it is hard to speculate about if there is an 
ideological – more specifically, a patriotic or nationalistic – component which 
opted for the rallying behind the British Prime Minister. The fact that letters from 
readers often mirrored the pattern in the newspapers, the result fits in well with 
previous research within agenda setting.  
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This study have also brought forth a medial perspective on the appeasement 
politics of the 1930’s. Despite Hitler’s repeated aggressions, most notably 
culminating in the de-militarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss, texts on 
the risks of future aggression was surprisingly absent. Exempted from this are 
those who early on reported with a Czechoslovakian perspective, such as The 
Scotsman. 
The anti-Czech attitude Vít Smetana have written about is also present, albeit 
in a different manner. Since Smetana focused on the British parliament, where 
these anti-Czech attitudes were apparent, while I was focusing on media, I did not 
get the same results. Although many politicians were quoted in several 
newspapers, any anti-Czech attitudes was not put forth. Instead, such opinions are 
instead shared by readers. On several occasions, the very creation of 
Czechoslovakia was questioned, and if not that, then at least Germany had a right 
to the Sudetenland to “unite their race”. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 The Munich Agreement 
Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, 
France and Italy 
GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, 
which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten 
German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said 
cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold 
themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:  
(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.  
(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be 
completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and 
that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation 
without damage to the said installations.  
(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international 
commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and 
Czechoslovakia.  
(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will 
begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by 
German troops in the following order:  
The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the 
2nd and 3rd of October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the 
territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of 
preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international 
commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.  
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(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in 
which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until 
the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the 
plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission 
will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.  
(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international 
commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor 
modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be 
transferred without plebiscite.  
(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be 
exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak 
commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer 
of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.  
(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this 
agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish 
to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten 
German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.  
Munich, September 29, 1938. 
ADOLF HITLER, 
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, 
EDOUARD DALADIER, 
BENITO MUSSOLINI. 
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6.2 Sudetenland 
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